Question One. Whether a Character is Impressed in Baptism

187. As to the first [n.186] argument is made that there is not:

Because circumcision did not impress a character; therefore neither does baptism.

The consequence is plain, because baptism has succeeded to circumcision, and as a remedy against the same sickness; therefore a similar effect belonged to both. The antecedent is plain, because the character of circumcision would have been of the same idea as the character of baptism, and then it would follow that someone circumcised would not have had to be baptized, because two accidents of the same species cannot be in the same thing; the consequent is false, as is plain above d.3 n.131.

188. Again, faith distinguishes the faithful from the infidel, and charity the son of perdition from the son of the Kingdom (according to Augustine On the Trinity XV.18 n.32; cf. Matthew 13.38). And these are the most noble things in the soul, and yet they do not impress any distinctive character; therefore, much more does baptism not do so.

189. Again, if a character be impressed, it is not a substance, because it arrives after perfect being does; nor is it a per se an accident or one that is necessarily inherent, because it is not caused by the principles of the subject; therefore, it would be an accident per accidens. But every such accident is separable and exists contingently; therefore, a character would be separable from the soul, the opposite of which is held by all those [William of Auxerre, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Richard of Middleton] who posit a character in the soul.

190. To the contrary:

Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy ch.2, says that “to him who comes to baptism a seal of the sacrament is given by the priest” - which is only the character.

191. Again, Damascene Orthodox Faith ch.82 says that “through baptism there comes to be in us regeneration and a seal” - by ‘seal’ meaning a character.

192. Again, baptism is an unrepeatable sacrament, from the preceding question [nn.158, 163-166];     therefore , it impresses some indelible effect, because if every effect of it could be destroyed, baptism could be repeated; but it has no indelible effect save character; therefore etc     .

I. To the Question

193. Here must be understood that a question ‘whether something is’ presupposes as manifest only what is asserted by the name, as is plain from the question about the definition of a sacrament in general, d.1 nn.181-187.

194. First, then, let the meaning of the name ‘character’, according to which there is here question or discussion of it, be set down; second let inquiry be made about the principal thing, whether anything of this sort is in the soul through reception of baptism.

A. About the Meaning of this Name ‘Character’

195. About the first (by moving from word from word), ‘character’ signifies the same as ‘figure’, and thus is it taken in Hebrews 1.3: where we have ‘the figure of his substance’, in Greek is put ‘the character’. And in this way do we call characters the figures by imposition that letters are written in; and in this way we call characters (in chants and the like) certain protracted figures and in this way is ‘the figure of the beast’ in Revelation 13.16-17, 14.9 etc., taken to be a figure on the forehead or on the hand, which signifies that the person so marked belongs to the family of the beast.

196. Now more generally ‘character’ is taken for a sign, and in this way baptismal washing can be called a character, because it is a certain sign.

197. The form also of the words in a sacrament can be called a character, as the Master speaks of character in this distinction (as said in the previous question [n.162]).

198. But, setting all these aside, theologians, when speaking of character as we are speaking of it in the issue at hand, commonly conceive by ‘character’ something spiritual impressed by God on the receiver of a non-repeatable sacrament.

199. From this idea of the name some properties of character follow, two of which are common to it and to any form (namely that it is a form assimilating one to someone else who has it, and that it is a form distinguishing one from someone else who does not have it), and others are special, one of which is that it is a sign commemorative of a sacrament received, another is that it is sign conforming one to Christ, whose sacrament is received, and also imposing obligation on one, in the way that he who receives a sacrament is obligated by reception of it.

200. Now from this idea of the name it is plain that character is not grace or any infused virtue (as faith or hope and charity), because such virtues are not always impressed on him who receives an unrepeatable sacrament (as on someone pretending), but character is always impressed.

201. This is also plain from a certain other condition that those who commonly speak about character attribute to it, namely that it is indelible; but these virtues are not indelible, as is plain about someone sinning mortally, in whom the virtues do not remain.

B. About the Impressing on the Soul of Character thus Understood

202. The second main point [n.194] is whether something possessing this idea of the name and of the properties is impressed on the soul of the one baptized.

1. First Opinion: Neither by Natural Reason nor from Things Believed can it be Proved that a Character is Present in the Soul

203. It is said here that there is not [a character in the soul].

204. And the mode of stating it is this: just as nothing real is impressed on other consecrated things that do not receive formal sanctity in their consecration, so since, in the issue at hand, the recipient of the sacrament does not receive formal sanctity, no real form necessarily is impressed on him. The proof of the likeness is that other sanctified things that do not receive formal sanctity are not distinguished from the man as to the act, when from this act he does not receive sanctity. Now the assumption about these other things is plain in the case of a sanctified chalice, because it receives no real form, as well as a dedicated church and blessed water and priestly garments and the like.

a. First Reason

205. Argument for this conclusion:

First as follows: just as, following natural reason, more things are not to be posited whose necessity is not clear from things known by natural reason [supra d.1 nn. 294, 300], so about what is believed or the sacraments more things are not to be posited whose necessity does not appear necessary, or needing to be posited, according to the faith. But such a necessity for an impressed form does not appear even according to things that are believed about baptism.

206. The proof of the minor is that neither does Sacred Scripture express that this is necessary in baptism, nor do the saints explicitly express it, nor does it follow evidently from the truth believed about baptism, because the whole truth of baptism consists in the visible sacrament and the invisible effect; and when Augustine specifies the invisible effect, he commonly calls it grace [e.g. Sermon 994, ‘On the day of the Pasch,’ I ch.1 n.1, et al.]

α. Objection

207. Here the response is made that the Saints do sufficiently hand on a tradition about the character in the way we speak of it, as is adduced from Dionysius and Damascene [nn.190-191].

β. Response to the Objection

208. But these authorities seem to be only verbal, and not to the intention of the saints -

209. [Proof that the authorities are only verbal] - for as is evident from looking at the translation and exposition of the Abbot of Vercelli,Abbot Thomas Gallus, who wrote a paraphrase/exposition of this work of Dionysius; the translation is not by him but was mistakenly attributed to him. ⁴⁷ Dionysius Ecclesiastical Hierarchy ch.2, on the words cited [n.190], where the Abbot says according to that translation: “The divine beatitude receives him [the one baptized], thus drawn upward, to participation in himself, and hands over of his own light to him, as by a certain sign, making him divine and in communion with those who remain in God.” And there follows there, “A holy sign from the hierarch, a seal given to the one who comes forward,” where some add from another translation words of this sort, “To him who comes to baptism is given by the supreme priest a sacred seal.”

210. Likewise he [the one who holds this view, n.190] adduces this from Damascene IV ch.1 as follows, that “through baptism is given to us regeneration and a seal;” by seal, according to them, is understood character. In the same place Damascene says of the three [qualities of the sign of the cross]Damascene, Orthodox Faith, ch.84, “This cross is given to us as a sign on the forehead, in the way circumcision was given to Israel. This is the helmet and shield and trophy against the devil; these are the seal.” ⁴⁸, “as circumcision was for Israel,” and after it, “and a seal.”

211. [Proof that they are not adduced to the intention of the authors] - These authorities [of Dionysius and Damascene] are not adduced to the intention of the authors:

About the first [n.190] it is clear, because as the plain ground of the text has it, and as Vercelli expounds that part of ch.2, para. 6, Dionysius is making determination about a certain preamble to baptism, namely how, according to the rite of the Greeks in the primitive Church, the one to be baptized was first brought into the Church, and on his head the hierarch put his hand and put a sign on him, commanding the priests to register both him and his reception. That would happen long before the baptizing, as is plain from the procedure of the text there, because determination is made about the act of baptizing in para.17 there, under the letter R.

212. Whence too that text of Dionysius in the translation of Vercelli is adduced in truncated form [n.190]. For after premising “and hands over of his own light to him, as by a certain sign...and in communion with those who remain in God etc.” [n.209], he adds about them, “Whose is the holy sign, a seal given by the hierarch to the one who comes forward, and the saving registration by the priests.” ‘Whose’ - I say render singulars for singulars,That is, each singly of ‘those who remain in God’ received singly the same ‘holy sign’ or ‘seal’, and this they received long before baptism. Scotus’ point seems to be that the omission of ‘whose’ in the initial citation [n.209] gives the misleading impression that someone baptized receives an additional holy sign or seal. In fact, however, the true meaning is that everyone, those who were in communion before and he who has become so now, received the same sign or seal, and that this sign or seal, in context, was the laying of hands on the head and registration by the priests, and that it all preceded baptism. Hence it can have nothing to do with any sign or seal or ‘character’ impressed at baptism, and only the omission of ‘whose’ could insinuate otherwise. ⁴⁹ that is, ‘the holy sign’ of the light handed on, ‘a seal given by the hierarch’, namely the imposition of hands on his head; and that he be in communion with those who are divine the sign is ‘the saving registration of the priests’, namely those who register him and his reception, as received into the communion of Christians. - Now this imposition of hands and registration happened long before baptizing; therefore, in no way can these things said here be understood of any sign impressed in baptism.

213. The authorities from Damascene [nn.191, 210] are very ineptly adduced.

Because a part of one passage is conjoined to a part of another, with a sentence passed over that needs to be continued with the preceding part. For the text of Damascene runs thus: “Through baptism we take up the first fruits of the Holy Spirit,” and it is a verse there; and another verse follows, “and the beginning of a second life becomes regeneration for us,” and then follows at once, “sign and protection and illumination.”     Therefore , in no way does he mean to say that through baptism a seal is made for us, but that by baptism we take up ‘the first fruits of the Holy Spirit’ in the first verse, and in another clause that ‘regeneration is the beginning of life and a sign etc     .’ Therefore from this authority can be got only that baptism, or regeneration, is a sign, and not that through baptism a sign is made for us.

214. And the other authority from Damascene [n.210] is of no validity, for he is expressly speaking there of the cross when he says “It is given to us as a sign on the forehead, as circumcision was for Israel; for by it the faithful are distinguished from infidels;” and about the same cross there follows, “This is the helmet and shield and trophy against the devil, and a sign that the ravager not come near us.” He does not mean to say more than that the cross is impressed on us as a sign against the enemy - which is not relevant to the matter in hand.

215. And there is a confirmation of this, because Augustine, who only treated of what baptism was intended for (namely in On Baptism against the Donatists VI and On Baptism of Children III and On the Single Baptism and much in his commentary On John and On the Faith to Peter [actually by Fulgentius]), would not have kept silent about ‘character’ if it had been an immediate and necessary effect of baptism.

216. And if you say ‘he does not deny it’, I reply: for the matter in hand it is sufficient that he not affirm it, because it is supposed to be a matter for so great investigation that, if character had been a thing proper to baptism, he would have been express about it elsewhere. But as it is, he only distinguishes in baptism the ‘sacrament’, that is, something externally visible, and ‘the thing of the sacrament’, namely grace; nor does he ever say that someone pretending receives any ‘thing of the sacrament’ but only the ‘sacrament’; nor does he ever show that baptism is unrepeatable through such an impressed character.

217. Likewise too in Gratian, Decretum p.3 d.4: the authorities of the saints about baptism are collected, and it does not seem likely that none of them would have spoken about character if it had been so necessary an effect of baptism.

218. And what seems much to be of weight, the Master of the Sentences never spoke about the character according to that understanding,Lombard speaks of character in Sent. V d.6 ch.2 n.3 and d.24 ch.13 n.1, but not in the sense of its being a necessary effect of the sacrament. ⁵⁰ although however he diligently compiled the authorities of the saints about the matters he deals with.

b. Second Reason

219. Second, argument is given principally in the way following, and it returns to the same truth [n.205; d.1 n.300], namely that a plurality is not to be posited without necessity. And the argument is as follows: nothing in vain is to be posited in the works of God, because “God and nature do nothing in vain” [On the Heavens 1.4.271a33]; but a character according to this understanding [nn.198-199], if it be posited, is posited in vain.

220. Proof of the minor: first by comparison with the main effect of baptism, which is grace [n.198]; second by comparison with those effects that are attributed to character, namely to assimilate, to distinguish, etc. [n.199].

221. As to the first [n.220] the argument is as follows:

If [a character] is required as a disposition for grace, either then on the part of what receives or on the part of the agent. Not on the part of what receives, because a soul that does not have sin actually [sc. those just now baptized] is supremely disposed to receive grace; nor on the part of the agent, because the agent [sc. God] is of infinite virtue.

222. And if you say it is required as a permanent disposition for inducing, at some point later in time, an effect that is not induced at once (as for this purpose, that he who has, in pretense, been baptized may afterwards receive the effect of baptism) - against this as before [n.221]: a character is required for that later time (when he receives the ultimate effect of baptism) as a disposition either on the part of what receives or on the part of the agent, and the reasoning stands as before.

223. There is argument specifically for this, that God could, without such a sign, be present to the one baptized to cause the effect of baptism (after the pretense is removed), just as he would have been present in the baptism itself if the one baptized had not before been in pretense. And there is a confirmation, that the effect of baptism is not given to him who is supposed to have the character unless he truly repent; but by true penance, grace would, without such a form, be given.

224. As to the other effects [nn.220, 199] the proof of the point is that the one baptized could, without an inherent form, be assimilated to the baptized and distinguished from the non-baptized through receiving baptism, as is plain in many other cases (because someone professed in religion is assimilated to another who is professed, and distinguished from another who is not professed, not by some other form inherent in him after profession, but because he had such act [of profession] in the past).

225. In the same way about the third effect [in fact the fourth, n.199], namely that the sign is posited as configuring or obligating [the baptized] to Christ; for someone can be obligated to someone, and so be configured to him as to the obligation of configuring, without any inherent form; just as he who does homage to some lord is, after the homage, obliged to him to keep faith and so to a certain configuration, and someone professed is bound by his profession to be conformed or configured to his superior; and yet he who does not do homage or is not professed receives some absolute form to be a sign of configuration.

226. About the fourth effect [the third in n.199], namely that a sign commemorating the sacrament itself is posited, the argument is as follows: either because such a commemorative sign is posited in respect of the sacrament on account of the excellence of the sacrament in itself, or it is posited on account of some relation to others who may recognize from the sign the one signed.

227. Not in the first way, because faith and charity are more excellent than having received baptism, and yet they do not possess any commemorative sign after they have become present within.

228. Not in the second way, because either in comparison to God or to one’s neighbor; not as to God, because God would recognize, without any existent sign, him who has received the sacrament; not as to one’s neighbor, because either to the blessed in glory (for his greater glory in having the sign), or to the damned in hell (for his greater confusion who does not have such a sign). It is necessary to grant neither, because it is a greater glory for the blessed to have had an act of charity than to have received baptism, and it is a greater confusion for the damned to have fallen from charity than from the reception of baptism; and yet no commemorative sign for charity or a meritorious act is posited in the blessed or in the damned.

229. Now specifically about beatitude the argument is that, if the sign were in the haver of it for special excellence in glory, it would follow that only a priest among all Christians could have such an excellence in glory, because only a priest has all the characters. It would also follow that Christ would lack that excellence of glory, because he is not baptized thus with the baptism of Christ, because the baptism of John did not impress a character; nor was he a priest with the priesthood as it is conferred in priestly ordination, because he was not ordained by anyone; for equal reason neither was he confirmed with sacramental confirmation. It also follows that the holy Patriarchs and the Blessed Mother did not have that excellence in glory.

c. Third Reason

230. Again third, argument is made on the part of the gift in itself:

It does not seem probable that God would confer his gift on anyone who is not only in mortal sin but is mortally sinning in the very act.

231. And the proof of this is: “The works of God are perfect,” Deuteronomy 32.4, and therefore he cures no one whom he does not cure perfectly; for it is an impious thing to hope for pardon imperfectly from God; therefore, he gives no gift of his to anyone who is then actually sinning mortally. But someone who is pretending while receiving baptism is sinning mortally, because he is doing irreverence to the sacrament; therefore God does not, by virtue of this act in which he is sinning mortally, give him any special gift.

d. Fourth Reason

232. Again, every gift of God given to man either makes him graced or is freely given - understanding the ‘making him graced’ in this way: either actually or dispositively. Or more briefly it can be said that God gives no gift to anyone save either for that person’s good or for the Church’s good. This gift [sc. character] is not a gift freely given or a gift for the Church’s good (of which sort is the gift of tongues or other gifts the Apostle speaks of in II Corinthians 9.8-14 [also I Corinthians 12.4-11]); because it would be of no value save to him only who has it; it is also plain that no effect follows that is useful to the Church. But neither is it a gift that makes to be graced, because by this gift a person is not constituted in any degree of acceptation in respect of God. Nor too is such a gift conferred without grace and charity, because God heals perfectly.

e. Fifth Reason

233. Finally argument is made thus from the mode of being that is posited for character, because it is posited as indelible [n.201] - and this as follows: no form is present in the soul which God cannot destroy, because it is a lesser thing to destroy than to create, or at any rate there is no contradiction involved in saying that ‘a form created in the soul is destroyed from the soul’; therefore, if character is indelible, no such form is in the soul of the baptized.

f. Response to the Initial Arguments for the Opposite

234. According to this opinion [nn.203-204], the response to the two authorities [nn.190-191] adduced for the other side of the question is plain, because they are adduced badly and altogether not according to the intention of the authors, as is plain in the first reason for the opinion [nn.205-206, 208-218].

235. As to the reason for the first part introduced [n.192], about indelibility, I reply: the sacrament is not unrepeatable for the reason that it impress an indelible effect, but from divine ordination, as is said in the preceding question [n.163].

The reason can also be taken to the opposite: for a sacrament is more unrepeatable if it impress no form, because whatever form it impress, it could be deleted.

236. But if it is posited to be unrepeatable because it crosses over into the past, then the ‘indelible’ is preserved simply, because God could not, of his absolute power, make what is past not to have been past.

237. And if you take flight to the impressed form - since any form whatever can be destroyed, unrepeatability is simply not obtained. But if it be said that a past act is sign, since the past cannot be destroyed, that is, cannot not have been, it follows that the reason is simply one of impossibility.

2. Second Opinion: That there is a Character in the Soul can be Proved by the Authority of the Church and Various Elements of Congruence

238. One can say to the question in a second way that although ‘there is a character in the soul’ cannot be proved by natural reason, either universally (namely because it is necessary to grant that such a form is in the soul even because of the end), or in particular (by experience of some act or condition of an act manifesting that there is such a form in the agent who perceives his act - just as neither can this be proved of grace or charity, on which see Ord. III d.26 n.132, d.27 n.66; Ord. I d.17 n.126-129) -although, too, it cannot be proved from manifest things believed (whether those that are explicitly of the substance of the faith, or are contained in Scripture, or are manifestly deduced by the saints from things believed), because there appears no necessary relation of it to such believed things - yet a character can be posited, because neither is it repugnant to the soul itself to have such a form as character is described to be, nor consequently is it repugnant to God to be able to impress such a form on the soul.

239. But in order that it not be posited altogether in vain and without necessity, it is necessary to have some authority on which he may rest who does posit it, and then it will be easy to solve what is objected against it.

240. Now among the authorities of the saints in accord with this signification of ‘character’ that we are speaking about, there do not appear many express authorities, yet some are alleged:

241. Augustine On Baptism Against the Donatists VI ch.1 n.1, “It is sufficiently clear that a lamb, which had outside received the lord’s character, is when coming to safety corrected from going astray; however, let one acknowledge the lord’s character on it, since many wolves, who are seen within, impress a character on wolves.”A passage also quoted by Thomas Aquinas ST III q.63 a.1, and Richard of Middleton, Sent. IV d.5 princ.2 q.3. It reads more in full: “To have...and give and receive the sacrament of baptism is sufficiently clear to the pastors of the Catholic Church diffused through the whole world, by whom afterwards, with the authority of a plenary council at Carthage, the original custom was confirmed: that even a lamb that was going astray outside and had received the lord’s character outside from the deceiving plunderers of it, when coming to the safety of Christian unity, is corrected from going astray, freed from captivity, cured from the wound; yet the lord’s character on it is recognized rather than rejected, since that character is impressed by many, both wolves and on wolves, who are indeed seen inside; however, that they do not belong to the lamb, which is also one from many, is proved by the fruits of their morals.” ⁵¹

242. Ibid. I ch.1 n.2, “Just as someone baptized, if he have departed from unity, does not lose the sacrament of baptism, so someone ordained, if he have departed, does not lose the sacrament of giving baptism; for injury must not be done to any sacrament.”

243. In this authority [n.241] Augustine use the name ‘character’ several times, but it appears that nothing is to the purpose according to the signification of ‘character’ we are speaking about, because he says that ‘wolves impress a character on wolves’, which is more applicable to the sacrament of baptism than to any effect in the soul. Hence everywhere in this authority the term ‘character’, as to his intention, can be well taken for the effect of baptism, just as was said before [n.162] that the Master took ‘character’, in that definition there, for the form of baptism.

244. In brief, as is contained in Gregory IX, Decretals V tit.7 ch.9, ‘About Heretics’, “one must think about the sacraments of the Church the way the Roman Church thinks.”

245. Now the Roman Church seems to think that a character is impressed on the soul in baptism, as Innocent III says [ibid. III tit.42 ch.3], ‘About baptism and its effect’, “He who comes in pretense to baptism receives impressed the character of Christianity.” And in the same place near the end, “The sacramental operation does then impress a character, when it does not find the obstacle of a contrary will standing against it.” And if his first authority could be expounded by saying that the ‘character of Christianity’ is baptism itself, yet the second, which says ‘the sacramental operation also impresses a character’ seems to speak expressly of a character as of something impressed on the soul itself, the way we are speaking of it in the issue at hand.

246. On account, therefore, of the sole authority of the Church, as much as it helps for the present, one must posit that a character is impressed.

247. For this three congruences are possible.

The first is of this sort: it is congruous that for a perfect form some disposition is posited; grace is a perfect supernatural form; therefore it is congruous that there is for it some preceding supernatural form; such a form is character.

248. Second congruence is that it is congruous that God did not institute empty sacraments, at least for the New Law, which is perfect; therefore, it is congruous that his sacraments be received by no one without truly having some effect; but they do not always have grace, as is plain of someone in pretense; therefore some other effect.

249. The third congruence is that it is congruous that someone received into the family of Christ is distinguished from someone not received by something intrinsic to him; because although Christ could make distinction without such intrinsic thing, yet his distinction would be more perfect, both in itself and in comparison to the whole Church (namely the Church militant and triumphant), if it be done by some abiding intrinsic form than if it not be done so. Now, in the case of one who receives the sacrament, whereby entrance is made into the family of Christ, the distinguishing mark from him who does not receive it, and the mark that remains in him who does receive it, is posited to be a character.

250. Of these three congruences, the third is more reasonable because it is also specific to baptism.

251. The two others have this sort of probability, that if a character is posited, let it be posited in a way of such a sort as those congruences touch on.

252. Namely: according to the first [n.247] a disposition for grace is posited; for it is rational that, when two ordered forms are caused by the same agent in the same subject, this is not on an equality as to causation nor are they equally perfect, because let one be a disposition to the other, and this is not a more perfect to a more imperfect but the converse. Now character and grace are caused by God in baptism, and not on an equality in each way; therefore, since character is more imperfect, it is congruous that it is a disposition to grace, which is more perfect. - But yet this congruence does not prove that one must posit the sort of form as a disposition is, otherwise since in any sacrament whatever grace is conferred, a preceding disposition would be required in any sacrament whatever. However, by applying this reason [the first, n.247] specifically to baptism it gets a greater evidence, because the first sacrament conferring grace is baptism, and consequently in it should more be conferred a disposition to grace than in any other sacrament, because a disposition naturally precedes the form for which it is the disposition; and therefore there is no need that it be impressed thus in later sacraments.

253. But the second reason [n.248] is too universal, or more universal, because it is equally probative about any sacrament, because any sacrament is instituted so as not to be empty. But to posit that in the other sacraments there is some adornment corresponding to a character is altogether superfluous, as was touched on above in d.1 [n.329]. - And a reason can be formed about the other sacraments for the opposite, because the reason is not probative. For if someone who is equally in pretense can receive another sacrament the way someone in pretense receives baptism (which appears probable, because there seems no greater need of a determinate disposition for someone to receive the sacrament of baptism absolutely than for him to receive the sacrament of penance absolutely, and a recipient of the sacrament of penance absolutely in this respect, that a penitent in pretense receives altogether no invisible effect), then it is not necessary, for the truth of the sacrament, that someone baptized receive any invisible effect.

254. Thus briefly then, let the conclusion be held on account of the authority of the Church previously adduced [n.245]; and the two congruences, one about reception into the family of Christ [n.249] and the other about a disposition needing first to be conferred [n.247], are probable.

3. To the Arguments for the First Opinion

a. To the Argument about the Way of Positing a Character

255. To the arguments for the other opinion.

As to what is touched on first in the way of positing character [n.204], I say that other consecrated things do not receive a form inherent in them because they are not capable of it. But man is capable of grace and of some disposition or other for grace, and so when, because of his own impediment, he does not receive grace, he does yet receive the disposition - and that is a character.

256. And if it is objected: ‘in that respect in which a man does not receive sanctity formally he is not distinguished from those sanctified things that cannot receive sanctity formally (of which sort are a consecrated chalice and the like)’ - I reply: in the negation ‘not receive sanctity formally’ he is not distinguished from them, but he is distinguished from them in that he is capable not only of sanctity formally but of the disposition for it, and those others are not. And if he not reach the ultimate stage [sanctity formally] because of an impediment on his part, yet he does receive the preceding disposition.

b. To the First Reason

257. To the first reason, about the necessity of positing several things [nn.205-206], I say that although this cannot be proved with evident necessity from things believed, yet there is a necessity to posit what the Church posits. And there are the congruences of the sort before adduced [nn.247-249]. Nor is the negative argument valid, ‘if not Augustine nor Dionysius nor Damascene, therefore no one’ [nn.208-218]; for the authority of the Church is sufficient, because Augustine On the Morals of Manichaeans [actually Against the Letter of Manichaeus they call Fundamental ch.5 n.6] says, “I would not believe the Gospel unless I believed the Church” [more correctly: “But I would not believe the Gospel unless the authority of the Catholic Church moved me”].

c. To the Second Reason

258. To the next reason [nn.219-229], which proceeds from the same middle term, namely that nothing is to be posited in vain, I say that although God could, of his absolute power, cause the grace that is the principle effect of baptism, and could also cause the other proper effects assigned to character, namely to assimilate etc. [nn.220, 199], without the sort of absolute form that is set down as ‘character’, yet he is bound, of his ordained power, to cause those effects congruently to the mediating form, for the reasons already stated [n.247-249].

259. And then in response to the argument: when it is said ‘either it is a disposition on the part of what undergoes or of what acts’ [n.221], I say not on the part of what acts, as if it were a certain agent in the middle between what acts first and what undergoes; for I do not posit the character to have some active virtue with respect to causing grace, but only that God is present to it as to an invisible sign for the causing of the grace that it signifies (on the departure of impediment or inhering obstacle). Character as disposition, then, is on the part of the receiver, because it is a prior form without which the later form is not received; not indeed because it is the idea of what receives in respect of the later form, but because it is present first before the later is - not simply necessarily, but necessarily when compared to the power of the agent that causes both forms.

260. And when it is said further that the effect of baptism could be had through true penance [n.223], I say that, according to that opinion [sc. the opinion that posits character], perfect innocence cannot, of ordained penance, be had without such intrinsic form, to which God is present to cause such innocence.

261. As to what is objected about other effects, namely about distinction and assimilation [n.224], the answer is plain: although absolutely distinction and assimilation could exist through an act that crosses over into the past, yet they exist more perfectly and are more congruent through some form left behind after the act that passes.

262. Likewise to the point about obligating and configuring [n.225], because if a man who receives the homage of another, or a prelate who receives another into profession, could impress some form on the one obligated, he would do this rather than that the other were absolutely obligated to him through a past act. Now God can impress on the soul such a configuring form, that is, a form showing obligation.

263. Now as to what is added about the commemorative sign [n.226], I say that it is commemorative not only because of those in respect of whom it has the idea of a sign that leads to the idea of the one signed (as is argued by the disjunction [n.226]), but it has the idea of commemorative sign because of him who receives it. And yet if it is posited because of others, it would not only be something commemorative in itself of the sacrament, but it would also be a sign leading to it, as another sign is said to be that makes something come to knowledge; it can also be conceded that [it would be a sign making something come to knowledge] in comparison to God and neighbors, whether in beatitude for glory or in damnation for confusion.

264. And as to what is objected, that God could recognize a lamb without a sign [n.228], it is not a problem, because he can also know the lamb with a sign as well. The blessed also and the damned can know the lamb signed which they would not know unsigned, because in beatitude it is for greater glory and in damnation for greater confusion [cf. Revelation 7.4, Ezechiel 9, 4-6].

265. And when objection is raised about faith and charity or about merits [nn.227-228], it will be spoken of in response to the second main argument [n.277].

266. But as to the objections made there [n.229] about Christ and his Mother, that the character is of no advantage to the blessed for glory, they can be solved, because, just as in created nature there are some perfections that are not simply so but are in such a nature, because they are perfections that supply for imperfection, so can it be said about this [character], that it is a perfection supplying for an imperfection, and so does not belong to one [sc. Christ] who is altogether perfect; nor too does it belong to the person [sc. Mary and the Patriarchs] in whom is another perfection supplying for the imperfection, which is greater than this one is [sc. than character].

d. To the Third Reason

267. To the third reason [n.230] it can be said that God does confer some gift of his on someone sinning mortally, and in the act in which he sins mortally, because he does not want his sacrament, which is truly received by the one sinning, to be vain; and so he wills to cause some effect there, but not the ultimate effect, because the one sinning is not disposed for it.

268. And when you prove that God cures perfectly [n.231], I concede it, when he cures; but he does not then cure, rather he only disposes or prepares for curing, and I concede that he prepares perfectly.

269. And this is reasonable, because although perhaps, in actions of his good pleasure as to private persons, he not confer his gifts pertaining to the salvation of that person save by perfectly healing that person, however in his universal acts, which are concomitant with his universal remedies (of which sort are the sacraments), it is reasonable that he has ordained the causing of some universal effects along with such remedies, but not the ultimate ones, because not all who receive those remedies are suited for this.

e. To the Fourth Reason

270. By this is plain the answer to the fourth reason [n.232]: I concede that [character] is a gift pertaining to the good of the receiver, and not of the Church.

271. And when you say that such gift is not conferred without the other gifts that perfect such a person [n.232] - this can be conceded in the case of special actions about special persons and in a special way; but not about general actions concomitant with general remedies constituted for the whole human race; for he causes them regularly along with the remedies, lest they be vain.

f. To the Fifth Reason

272. As to the fifth [n.233]; although many things are said about the indelibility of character, and although it is not very useful to recite them, I say in brief that there can be no form different from the soul in the soul that God could not, of his absolute power, destroy (as a posterior from a prior), because in this no contradiction can be found. But a character, if it be posited, is indelible in this way, nor can it be destroyed in this way; because neither can it be destroyed by virtue of some creature (as is plain, because the form is supernatural), nor by divine virtue of its ordained power, because God has ordained to destroy no supernatural form save because of some demerit in him who has it; but, with respect to destroying a character, there can be no demeriting cause; for when it is impressed in an act of sinning mortally, nothing can deserve by demerit that the form [of the character] be taken away.

273. Here note, against Thomas [Aquinas, supra d.1 n.281, ST III q.63 a.5], that one should not posit any supernatural virtue in the sacrament, because that virtue could not be corrupted in the same way he posits the character cannot be destroyed.

II. To the Initial Arguments

274. As to the first initial reason [n.187], the same Thomas [Aquinas, Sent. IV d1 q.2 a.4] concedes that circumcision did not impress a character, and then against him is the argument in that question about the efficacy of the sacrament with respect to grace [supra, d.1 nn.278-282The editors of the Quarrachi edition add: “What Scotus says there about the sacraments of the New Law he now applies also to circumcision.” ⁵²]; for he posits that it only has efficacy with respect to grace because it is an instrument with respect to a certain disposition for grace. I say therefore that it can be conceded about circumcision that some character was impressed there just as in baptism; for it was thus the first door of salvation in the Mosaic Law as baptism is in the New Law.

275. And when it is argued [n.187] that then someone circumcised would not need to be baptized, I deny the consequence.

276. As to the proof [ibid.] I say that it can be conceded that either the character would be of the same idea as the character of baptism or of another idea. But if it is of the same idea, either the character was not impressed by the baptism received by someone circumcised - just as on a subject, who possesses some sort of form, that sort of form is not impressed again, even by a cause that would be of a nature otherwise to impress such a form; and this for the reason that the subject is not in potency but already in act with respect to this form. Or if another character of the same idea were impressed in baptism, nothing unacceptable follows, at least if character be posited to be a relation, as was said about relations in Ord. III d.8 n.24. Or it could be said that the character of circumcision differs from that of baptism as the imperfect from the perfect, in the way that the grace of this [person] differs from the grace of that one, and then in the receiving of baptism a new character would not be impressed on someone previously circumcised, but his first one would be perfected.

277. To the second [n.188] I say that not every perfection in the soul has such a perpetual commemorative sign; but such a sign has that by which he who has the perfection is constituted in some determinate rank in the Church; of this sort are not the virtues (because they are common to all members in any rank) but the sacraments, both the one through which entrance is made into the Church and the others (as the sacraments of confirmation and of ordination), as will be stated in the following question [nn.328-332].

278. To the third [n.189] the answer is plain from the solution of the fifth reason for the preceding opinion [nn.232, 272].